CONTEXTUALITY AND UNIVERSALITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL BORROWINGS ON THE GLOBAL
STAGE - THE HUNGARIAN VIEW
Ire

Viris"

I. INTRODUCTION - A NEW EPIDEMY IN CENrrRAL AND EASTERUN
EUROPE: ESTABLISHING CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS

A. The Hungarian Constitutionand the Constitutional
Court Emerged in 1989
Even during the last years of communist rule in Hungary a "Constitutional Council" was set up. This organ was formed in order to
"play" constitutionalism when Hungary did not have a constitution
based in the rule of law, but a communist constitution. The Constitutional Council was no more than a propaganda organ of the regime.
Only in the spring of 1989, when the National Round Table negotiations between the interim government and the opposition began, did
the question of the new constitution reach the agenda. In September
1989, when the draft of the new constitution was almost completed,
the participants in the talks - both the interim government and the
opposition - agreed that the content of the draft was worthy of protection by a constitutional court.
Therefore, the draft law setting up a ConstitutionalCourt of the Republic of Hungary was worked out quickly in the fall of 1989 and enacted as Act No. XXXII together with the new Constitution in October
1989. The Constitutional Court began its activity onJanuary 1, 1990.
The Act was developed in the framework of a research project of
the Institute for Administrative and Legal Sciences of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences and involved a thorough comparative analysis of
the systems of contemporary constitutionalcourts. As a reaction to the just
outgoing communist dictatorship, the German model, with a very
strong constitutional court, was regarded as a model to be followed.
The U.S. model, and the role of the U.S. Supreme Court, was examined as well. But it was acknowledged that the U.S. Supreme Court
works under different circumstances and under a different system of
separation of powers - most clearly the U.S. presidential system.
.Justice at the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Hungay., Chairholder
at the University of Budapest, Law School at Gy6r.
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B. The HungarianConstitutionalCourt is a Very Strong State Organ'
The Hungarian Constitutional Court has a very wide competence: its
basic activity relates to the supervision of the constitutionality of legal
regulations enacted by the Parliament, the national government, and
the local governments. Moreover, the Court has competence for the
preliminary supervision of acts that were passed by the Parliament,
but not signed by the President of the Republic. The Court is competent to interpret the Constitution and to decide whether the legislature omitted its legislative duties and, therefore, whether an unconstitutional situation emerged. The Court has the right to decide
constitutional disputes between different state organs over their powers and even to impeach the President of the Republic.
It seems clear that the Court is in a certain context the most powerful state organ in the Republic of Hungary. It cannot create - decide in a positive way - the law in Hungary, but it can prevent - in a
negative way - a definite, unconstitutional, legal regulation of the Parliament, of the government or of the local government, by abolishing
the law. Therefore, during the transition period between 1990 and
1995, all the most important legal regulations, which had for decades
decided the "face" of the Hungarian democracy, were investigated by
the Court; the most important enactment disputes of the Parliament
were decided finally in the course of an investigation within the
framework of the Constitution and before the Constitutional Court.
Thus, the Court played an eminent role in the formation of the new
Hungarian democracy and in the formation of Hungary's new legal
and socio-economic system.
This occurred because the Court's extraordinarily wide competence is tied to an actio popularsprovided for the people; everybody,
even foreigners, has the right to launch a procedure before the
Court, even if they do not have a definite legal interest. As a consequence, almost all the important legal regulations were brought in
front of the Court by somebody - a natural or legal person, a countryman, or a foreigner.
C. The Development of ConstitutionalCourts in Centraland Eastern Europe
Setting up constitutionalcourts became, in the course of the transition from communist rule to democracy, an "epidemy" in Central and
Eastern Europe; the characteristic indicator of the extent to which a
state is ruled by law became whether a constitutional court had been
I SeeA MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKOTMArNA [Constitution] ch. IV (delineating the competence and the powers of the Constitutional Court). An English translation of the Hungarian
Constitution is easily available at www.wiretap.spries.com:70/OO/gov/world/hungary.com.
2 See id. at ch. IV, art. 32/A(2).
3 See id. at ch. IV, art. 32/A(3).
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formed. This fact led to an influx of constitutional courts. The value
of the work done by the courts, however, has been very different. In
Yugoslavia, a constitutional court was established even before the
changes of 1989-1990, and it still exists. The court's application to be
a member of the Conference of the European Constitutional Courts,
however, was rejected in the mid-1990's.
11. THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT - THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A. The Impossibility of Discussing ConstitutionalLaw Before 1989
Before 1989 with a communist constitution, one could have hardly
spoken about constitutionallaw in Hungay, in the sense used in modern
democracies. Considering the legal system as a whole, and in particular
the constitutional law, it was hardly possible for the legislature to
"borrow" experiences from the West. The use of the comparative
method, however, was common in legal science. Researchers visited
western - mostly European - countries and gained experience with
the legal framework of rule of law democracies and market economies. In the mid-1970's, Prof. Gyula Ersiestablished in Hungary the
convergence theory.4 This theory, widely spread in the West, stated
that there are certain common areas of Western and Soviet-type legal
systems. A famous result of the efforts in Middle and Eastern
Europe to accept the convergence theory was the Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods.
B. Economic Legislation
As far as legislation was concerned, it became possible to begin to
study free market solutions in the early 1970's within the framework
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. This research resulted in
many market economy-orientated acts - for example, the Competition Act of 1984. The Competition Act of 1984 was the first competition legislation in Eastern Europe. It was then borrowed wholesale by
other East-European nations' legal systems, including China's. The
Act was strongly influenced by U.S. antitrust legislation, and even the
introduction of a treble damages provision was considered.
C. ConstitutionalLaw
The field of constitutional law was not touched by this development
since it may have threatened the "heart" of the existing system by
See GVIJLA E6RsI, COMPARATIVE CIVIL (PRIVATE) LW: L\W T'*PES. L%%w
GROvlPs. THE
RoADs TO LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 363-413 (Gibor Pulay et a]. trans. & Muntine Pctein & Kenneth Munn eds., 1979).
4
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suggesting that the manner with which power was exercised should
be revised. The revision of the old legal material became unavoidable during the round table discussions in 1989. Without such
changes the new democracy could not have been introduced and the
democratic election of 1990 could not have been held.
The efforts to establish a new Constitution resulted in the draft law
which was enacted by the Parliament in October 1989. The text was
brand new although the numeration of the old constitution (Act No.
XX (1949)) remained since the Constitution was considered to be an
interim text. The intention was that Parliament would enact the fifial
Constitution after the free democratic elections of Parliament in
1990. Almost the entire text of the old communist constitution was
replaced. Only one sentence remained: "The capital of Hungary is
Budapest."5
The intended new constitution is not yet enacted and it seems unlikely that it will be enacted in the near future. One cannot exclude
the possibility that the present constitution will serve the Republic of
Hungary for several decades. Since the text was borrowed from western
sources of constitutional law it is suitable for this purpose - with the
additional interpretation of the Constitutional Court.
D. Borrowingfrom ForeignExperiences
The solutions in the Hungarian constitution were borrowedfrom the
national constitutions of western democracies. The American, German,
French, Spanish and Italian Constitutions were all considered together with the practice of their respective constitutional courts.
Attention was given also to the internationalconventions in the field
of human rights. Among others, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948), the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)
were considered.
Considering international conventions became a constitutional
obligation of the new Hungarian democracy because Article 7(1) of
the new constitution lays down the requirement that the Court harmonize internal law with the international law. 6

A MAGYAR KOzTiRASA.G ALKOTMINANYA ch. XIV, act. 74.
6 See id. at ch. I, art. 7(1) ("The legal system of the Republic of Hungary accepts the universally recognized rules and regulations of international law, and harmonizes the internal laws
and statutes of the country with the obligations assumed under international law.").
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL BORROWINGS - WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE

PRACrIcE OF THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (HCC)

A. The Influence of National Constitutionson the Practiceof the Hungarian

ConstitutionalCourt - Selected Examples
Early on, the unconstitutionality of the death penalty was investigated. In the death penalty case, decided in 1990, the Hungarian Con-

stitutional Court held the death penalty unconstitutional. One of the
concurring opinions referred to the U.S. Supreme Court's now overruled decision in Furman v. Georgia8 as a liberal example for other nations, but also analyzed the subsequent development - the reversal
tendencies since 1976. 9
In the agriculturalland case,'0 the constitutionality of a prohibition
against the acquisition of agricultural land by agricultural cooperatives was questioned. The Hungarian Constitutional Court held
this legislation constitutional. One parallel opinion referred to the
U.S. Supreme Court's judgment in Board of Regents v. Roth," in which
the Supreme Court held the constitutional right to property only protects vested benefits. In the same case, the question of the freedom
of contract was investigated as well, and one parallel opinion - referring to the U.S. Supreme Court's judgment in Holden v. Hardy5 stressed that only the restraint of
4 the general power to acquire property would be unconstitutional.'
In 1993, the Hungarian Constitutional Court examined the con-

stitutionality of the state owned undertakings.'5 In this case, the Court
analyzed the nature of the market economy and stressed that according to the principle of market economy laid down in Article 9 of the

7 See judgment 23/1990 [death penalty case] (X.31.) AB [Constitutional Court of Hungary]
ABH 1990, 89. This article will cite to Hungarian cases in the continental tradition. The citation lists the official number of the case in the year it was decided, 23/1990. and where it appears in the Official Journal followed by the date the decision was handed down in brackets,
here October 31, the abbreviation for the court that decided the case, followed by the reporter
and page number in brackets, ABH 1990. For ease of reference, this article will also incorporate the case's common name, and use the common name for subsequent short citations.
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
9 See death penalty case, ABH 1990 at 99. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld a modified death
penalty statute in Georgiav.Gregg 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
10 Seejudgment [agriculturalland case] 35/1994 (VI.24.) AB,ABH 1994, 197.
1 408 U.S. 564 (1972)).
12 See agiculturalland case, ABH 1990 at 213. In Roth, the U.S. Supreme Court explained
that a employee, who had been hired to a one-year contract, had no property right in continued employment after the one year since neither the contract, nor the statute, created an interest in further employment. See Roth, 408 U.S at 576-78.
is169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898) (upholding state legislation limiting the working hours of miners challenged as for violating freedom of contract as a valid exercise of the public welfare powers).
14 See agriculturalland case,ABH 1994 at 217.
15Seejudgment 33/1993 [state owned undertakings] (V.28.) AB, ABH 1993,247.

JOURNAL OFCONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 1: 3

Hungarian Constitution1 6 is simply an aim of the state and does not
provide a fundamental right. Therefore, the economic policy cannot
be evaluated according to the Constitution because the Constitution
is - at least from the point of view of the Constitution - neutral." The
reference to the German Investitionshilfe Urteit8 cannot be mistaken,
but the German view was based on the U.S. practice first outlined in a
dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York'V according to which the
constitution does not "embody a particular economic theory."'0
The influence of U.S. constitutional practice can be discovered
even in arguments to the Hungarian Constitutional Court. In 1994, a
Hungarian citizen criticized the HungarianPenal Code and took reference to the flag burning - symbolic speech - holding in Texas v. Johnson.2 ' Launching the procedure, the proponent argued that the
American constitutional discussion / protections concerning freedom of speech could orient the Hungarian Constitutional Court.
The Hungarian Constitutional Court takes into consideration the
practices of many other constitutional courts in a similar manner.
B. The Influence of InternationalConventions and Their Practice
The above-mentioned international conventions repeatedly influence the practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court. Since
Hungary is a member of the Council of Europe and signed the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the judgments of the European Court for Human
Rights are binding on Hungary. Therefore, the Hungarian Constitutional Court takes into account the practice of the European Court
for Human Rights since that Court has the ultimate authority to decide a human rights dispute.
For example, the decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights and the regulation of international conventions were referred
to in the death penalty case,22 the agriculturalland case,23 and in the punishability of communist crimes and the statute of limitation cases,2 4 decided
in 1993, as well as in the single decision concerning the freedom of press
and the freedom of speech as far as insultingpublic authorities/persons was
concerned.2 These conventions also were referred to in the public
16SeeA MAGYAR K6ZTASASAGALKoTMANYA ch. I, art. 9.
17 See state owned undertakings,ABH 1993 at
249.
18 See state owned undertakings,ABH 1993 at 249.

19SeejudgmentJuly 20, 1954 BVerfGE [Federal Republic of Germany] 4, 7, 17.
20Id
21 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
Seejudgment 23/1990 [death penalty case] (X.31.) AB [Constitutional Court of Hungary]
ABH 1990, 89.
23Seejudgment 35/1994 [agriculturalland case] (VI.24.) AB, ABH 1994, 197.
24Seejudgment 53/1993 [statute oflimitations case] (X.13.) AB,ABH 1993, 323, 330, 334.
21 Seejudgment 36/1994 [freedom of press and speech] (VI.24.) AB,ABH 1994, 224.
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data and information case,26 the Compensation Act case," by which property damage of the citizens under communist rule were partly compensated,
the case concerning the children's rights, and the Flats Act
29
case.
Even the ParisPeace Treaty (1947) which ended the Second World
War was the basis of a decision of the Hungarian Constitutional
Court.3° The Court found that the compensation duties of the Hungarian State to Jewish citizens had not been fulfilled in accordance
with the Treaty. The Hungarian Constitutional Court obliged the
Parliament to put an end to the unconstitutional omission.
C. Tw Dangers of Borrowing
Borrowing from other constitutional experiences is not always
without danger. Consider first examples of borrowing taken from international conventions rather than from constitutional practices of
other nation's courts.
In the Flats Act case,3' the Hungarian Constitutional Court mainly
based its decision on the judgment of the European Court of Human
Rights (Strasbourg) in James and Others.2 This judgment of the European Court of Human Rights dealt with an old British common law
institution: the long lease tenure, and thus, the Leasehold Reform Act of
196Z However, the Hungarian Constitutional Court investigated the
constitutionality of the Hungarian Flats Act's rules on the rent of flats
which is actually regulated under British law by the Rent Acts. The
comparison by the Court was thus false, since the subject - the legal
institution in question - in the Hungarian case and the European
Court of Human Right's judgment was completely different. The sole
fact that both affected flats was misleading. The failure to apply the
comparative method led to a false result.
The adoption of a German example concerning the constitutional
guarantee to property was misleading in another case - the 1995 case
on social rights.- The austerity package of the Hungarian government
in 1995 was a result of the catastrophic economic situation inherited
from the communist rule. The whole social system had to be reconsidered and many previous benefits were cut or abolished. Many
cases attacked the new regulations before the Hungarian Constitutional Court. The Hungarian Constitutional Court reversed a number of provisions cutting social services and claimed to adopt the
Seejudgment 34/1994 [public data and information case] (VI.24.) AB, ABH 1994, 185-86.
AB. ABH 1993. 119.
Seejudgment 879/B/1992 [children's fights] (???) AB, ABH 1992. 402.
Seejudgment 64/1993 [Rats Ac case] (XIL22.) AB. ABH 1993.380.
30 Seejudgment 16/1993 (I.12.) AB, ABH 1993, 143.
31 Seejudgment 64/1993 [Rats Ad case] (XII.22.) AB, ABH 1993.380.
98 EUR. Cr. I-.R (ser. A.) at 9 (1986).
Seejudgment 56/1995 (IX.15.) AB, ABH 1995, 260.
2

2 Seejudgment 15/1993 [CompensationAd Case] (I.12.)
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German view relating the interpretation of the constitutional right to
property. Applying the German view, not only civil law property, but
also social benefits and other claims were found to be protected under the right to property provision of the Hungarian Constitution. 4
Such claims were for example claims based on social law regulation
that are protected - according to the Hungarian Constitutional
Court's view - as vested rights acquired during previous decades.
Consequently, the Hungarian Constitutional Court - by adopting
the German view without critical analysis and without investigating
the whole legal and socio-economic environment in which the German decisions were made - protected many parts of the status quo inherited from the communist period without taking into consideration
the completely distinct legal nature of the right to property and to
social rights. The right to property in article 13(1) in the Hungarian
Constitution is a right of- so called -first generationwhere the state is
obliged in a negative way to refrain from intervening into a citizen's or
individual's life. 35 The right to social benefits, contained in article
70/E are second generation fundamental right where the state has a
6
duty to positively provide a definite social service and social assignment."
Therefore, social claims are protected - in my view - according to the
Constitution not simply by the right to property but in particular by
the separate social rights provision - as lex specialis. This provision
does not prohibit the government from revising positive social services and assignments according to the realities of the economic situation.
The qualification of social claims by the Hungarian Constitutional
Court, mechanically following the German view, might have resulted
in an unreformable social system. The Hungarian Constitutional
Court's practice was revised after some months and the constitutionality of social claim's legislation was later qualified as belonging under the framework of the Constitution's social rights provisions.
D. Adoption ofForeignAchievements Should Be Realized
Through the Application of the ComparativeMethod
The comparative method could prevent the mechanical adoption of
SeeA MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA ch. I, art. 13(1). A critical analysis of the judgment, see IMRE VOROS, A TULAJDONHOZ VALO JOG 8S TAS ONKORMANYZATOK [THE RIGHT TO

POSSESSION AND THE SELF-GOVERNMENTS] (Budapest 1994).
SeeA MAGYAR K6ZTARSAS&G ALKOTMANA ch. I, art. 13(1).
See id. at ch. XII, art. 70/E. This provision, which is one part of a larger grant of rights,
states:
(1) Citizens of the Republic of Hungary have the right to social security. In case of old
age, illness, disability, being widowed or orphaned, and in case of unemployment for no
fault of their own, they are entitled to the provisions necessary for subsistence.
The Republic of Hungary upholds the right of [the] people to be[] provided for through
the social security system and its institutions
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foreign ideas and practices by obliging the Court to take certain definite and non-exchangeable steps.
First: one must analyze not only one but many different foreign
legal solutions, judgments and their legal and socio-economic
policy background.
Second: one must analyze the Hungarian statute, regulation or
law and its legal and socio-economic policy background.
Third: one must compare (a) and (b) to determine the common "core" and the differences between them to ensure that
the legal institutions can be compared. "Comparison" of incomparable institutions misleads as occurred in the Rats Act
case.

Fourth: the foreign regulation or law behind the common core
should be investigated considering the possibility of the integration of the experience into the Hungarian legal system.
Fifth: the special legal item should be developed based on the
foreign judgment or legal regulation, which will be built into
the Hungarian Constitutional Court's decision as an integral
part of the Hungarian way of constitutional thinking.
Through the strict application of these steps and criteria, the application of each nation's achievements will not be a simple "translation" that remains a "foreign body" in the legal system, but rather an
inventive development of the national constitutional system. The
dangers of non-organic application of foreign ideas can be prevented: it is possible for citizens to receive their "own" constitution's
application from their own constitutional court. The people need
not receive constitutional "tomatoes" instead of the promised "potatoes."
IV. Su mARY: WHAT DOES UNIVERSALIY AND CONTEXTUALITY MEAN
IN THE FIELD OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW?

A. The Universality
The universality of constitutional law is expressed mostly by international law. Peace treaties in general can have consequences in the
development and application of constitutional law. International
conventions have the same effects. Today, these legal institutions are
the most effective means of harmonizingconstitutionallaws.
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B. The Contextuality
While international treaties and conventions are clearly influencing the legislation and the application of constitutional law, the constitutional context refers to national and internationalexperiences in the
application of constitutional law. Before constitutional courts decide
cases, it is advisable for them to investigate foreign experiences and
determine which ideas might be useful in the internal / national
court's decision. The context refers to definite a national constitutional court's practice or to international convention's practice, if a
special court exists for its application.
C. The Globalization
Globalizationat the beginning of the 21st century may mean that
the universality and the contextuality of constitutional law might develop in the direction of harmonization. But the chances of harmonization are different among the different fields of constitutional law.
The chances are favorable among the first generation fundamental
rights. In particular, the prospects are promising in the field of human rights. These rights affect the "eternal values" of mankind, they
formulate general principles and ideas which are theoretically acceptable all over the world independent from race, nation and religion.
The chances are not as favorable, but rather limited, in the field of
second and third generationfundamental rights, for example, the rights
to social security, to health care, to a healthy environment, to study
and culture, to a flat, etc. These rights affect the definite, concrete
social system and the market economy, including its efficiency, and,
therefore, are dependent to a great extent on the individual, concrete circumstances of each nation. Even historical traditions can influence constitutional law and its practice. These rights do not really
express "eternal" values of mankind and, therefore, can differ from
society to society and from community to community.
This does not mean that the universality and the contextuality of
constitutional law cannot influence the harmonization of this field of
constitutional law. It only means that the possibilities are not so wide
and favorable.
But international efforts, including conferences and collaborative
research efforts, may contribute to the harmonization of constitutional law in both fields.

For example, the European Court of Human Rights applies the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
37

